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The Prevention of Terrorist Recruitment Through Early Intervention by Involving Families 
Program was developed and implemented by the Sanliurfa Police Department’s 
counterterrorism and operations division in Sanliurfa, Turkey. The first phase, the pilot 
program, was implemented in 2010 and 2011. Its main objective was to prevent terrorist 
recruitment and radicalization through early intervention during the initial stages of the 
terrorist recruitment process, by involving the families and parents of potential recruits, seeing 
that they communicated with their children before the police did and monitored them under 
the guidance of the team.  
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Ahmet S. Yayla, Email: ahmet.yayla@desales.edu,  
2755 Station Avenue, Center Valley, PA 18034; United States of America 
Abstract 
Preventing terrorist recruitment is one of the most effective and less lethal 
methods of countering terrorism, and yet it is often overlooked. This article 
describes a program designed and administered by the author to prevent terrorist 
recruitment through early intervention, by promoting the involvement of the 
families of potential recruits in their children's activities and in a counterterrorism 
program that was developed and implemented in Sanliurfa, Turkey, for four years, 
from 2010 to 2014. The article details the concept and structure of the program, 
provides insights on how it was developed and administered, and presents the 
data, an analysis, and the findings. In addition, this article reports on the outcomes 
of the program and offers insights into why the youth in Sanliurfa were struggling 
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During the first phase in the first year of the program, the families of 371 university 
and high school students were visited to inform parents about their children’s association with 
known terrorist recruiters or entities and to counsel them on how to help their children cut 
their ties with terrorist organizations or people associated with terrorist entities. This article 
provides details of the Sanliurfa prevention program, analyzes the first year’s findings, and 
offers insights into the outcomes of the program, including why the youth in Sanliurfa were 
struggling to break their ties with terrorist organizations. 
 
Purpose of the Program 
 
The purpose of the program was to prevent terrorist recruitment and radicalization. It aimed to 
identify societal and individual signs of radicalization, in order to take early steps to thwart 
radicalization and terrorist recruitment by promoting interactions with the parents and family 
members of susceptible youth in Sanliurfa, Turkey. For the purpose of the Sanliurfa program, 
interaction refers to involving the families and parents of potential terrorist recruits to 
promote constructive communication with their children before the police do, with the 
assistance and guidance of the team.  
The program was designed to reach out to and engage young people and their families 
who were under the threat of terrorist recruitment and radicalization, to convey the message 
that “violence is not a solution,” and to reinforce parents’ objections to the radicalization and 
recruitment of their children. The expected outcome of the program was the successful 
dissuasion of terrorist candidates by their families, with professional and psychological 
assistance. 
 
Reaching out for this program meant:  
• establishing initial contact with the families of vulnerable youth, 
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• building mutual trust by explaining “the fact that the program is offering assistance to 
families to help save their children from the hands of terrorist organizations,” and 
• reassuring them that they faced no prosecution or investigation. 
 
Concept and Structure 
 
I developed the Preventing Terrorist Recruitment through Early Intervention by Involving 
Families Program when I was first assigned to the City of Sanliurfa as the chief of 
counterterrorism and operations in Turkey in 2010. The Sanliurfa program was not developed 
as a research project; rather, it was implemented as an intervention and prevention program to 
counter terrorist recruitment.  
Sanliurfa is one of the largest provinces of Southeastern Anatolia, with over two 
million residents. In addition, after 2010, when the conflict started in Syria, over 400,000 
Syrian refugees crossed the border to live in Sanliurfa.  
Sanliurfa is unique from the perspective of counterterrorism for a few reasons, 
including its demographics, history, and the current conflict in the region, in Syria in 
particular. Sanliurfa shares 139 miles of border with Syria, which is a critical issue when it 
comes to border movements between Turkey and Syria. The city historically has had 
ethnically mixed demographics; Turks, Kurds, and Arabs have lived there together for 
centuries. However, in the modern era, terrorist organizations have been very active in the 
city, including the PKK—which was first established there—the Turkish Hezbollah, al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates, and ISIS.  These groups operate there for two main reasons. The first is that 
the city serves as a base for recruitment and logistical and other operational support. The 
second is that Sanliurfa stands right at the border and furnishes ample opportunities for 
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“Jihadi Highway,” which alludes to the flow of ISIS foreign fighters through the city on their 
way to Syria.2 
I designed the prevention program as part of our ongoing efforts to counter terrorism 
in the city by reducing the number of youth who were being approached or recruited by 
terrorist organizations. In the beginning, the concept of the pilot program was to address 
counterterrorism by preventing the radicalization and recruitment of youth through the 
involvement of their families, and by giving the youth a second chance to re-think and assess 
their affiliations with terrorist organizations if they had not yet committed a violent crime in 
the name of a terrorist organization.  
The concept was a new phenomenon in 2010 and involved several stakeholders, 
including the Central Counterterrorism and Operations Department in Ankara, the general 
chief of the Sanliurfa Police Department, the governor, the attorney general of Sanliurfa, 
district attorneys, the mayor, and the director of the Sanliurfa Education Department. The first 
step in running the pilot program was to present it to the general chief of the Sanliurfa Police 
Department. After obtaining the police chief’s approval, I held a meeting with the governor, 
explaining to him what our plans were and asking for his administrative approval and 
financial support. After obtaining his approval, I presented the program to the Central 
Counterterrorism and Operations Department in Ankara to get the approval of the 
counterterrorism czar for all of Turkey, as counterterrorism activities are centrally coordinated 
in the country.  
Once the Ankara phase was completed, the main task was to get the judiciary on 
board, because I had to work with the prosecutor’s office in order to be able to promise our 
subjects that we (the counterterrorism division) were not going to open any investigations and 
that there would be no arrests or official recordkeeping. I first visited the attorney general (the 
head prosecutor) of Sanliurfa and presented the concept to him in detail; he approved of the 
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pilot program in principle and arranged a meeting with all the district attorneys who were 
involved in counterterrorism investigations. They were briefed on the program details and the 
proposed concept of not bringing any judicial charges if a participant had not been involved in 
any violent activities.  
Once I had the judiciary on board, I arranged meetings with the governor, the director 
of the Sanliurfa Education Department (who worked under the governor), and the Mayor of 
Sanliurfa to discuss their cooperation and support and layout plans, because our future 
preventive and educational activities would involve different departments and their different 
structures, and I knew I would need their assistance at certain points.   
It was quite challenging to bring all the stakeholders to the table and have them accept 
the concept of preventing terrorist radicalization and recruitment through family intervention, 
but in the end, I garnered all of the bureaucratic, judicial, and administrative approvals the 
counterterrorism division needed to launch the pilot program.  
The financing was mostly provided by the Central Counterterrorism and Operations 
Department in Ankara and the Sanliurfa Police Department; the Sanliurfa Governate 
contributed as well to the overall budget. We were also able to use various government 
facilities and means of transportation free of charge. The administration and implementation 
of the pilot program were assigned to the Counterterrorism and Operations division in 
Sanliurfa, and as the chief of that department, I ran the program.  
This program is an example of a “mesosocial prevention (general and specific) and 
intervention” program under Koehler’s classification3 of “three distinct methods of 
counterterrorism.” It can be classified as such because of the involvement of local crime 
prevention activities and federal and state action plans. It is a “mesosocial intervention” 
 
3 Kohler, Daniel. (2017). Structural Quality Standards for Work to Intervene with and Counter Violent 
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program because of the involvement of families, in keeping with Koehler’s notion of a 
“family support” counterterrorism model.4   
In the past, other scholars have administered programs with the involvement of family 
members and friends in efforts to counter terrorist recruitment through Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) or deradicalization. While programs have varied across countries and target 
populations, as explained by Horgan and Braddock,5 their concepts have usually been similar: 
to reduce the risk of involvement with terrorist organizations. Koehler and Ehrt consider the 
approach adopted by the Sanliurfa program to be a “first line of defense,” engaging families, 
friends, and colleagues in countering radicalization “without implying the use of emotional 
relationships for intelligence gathering or policing.”6 
Several other researchers, including Ranstorp and Hyllengern,7 Sikkens and her 
colleagues,8 Vidino,9 Gielen,10 and Koehler,11 have studied the concept of early intervention 
through family counseling in countering terrorism and the role of families and friends in 
different forms of counter-radicalization/terrorist recruitment and deradicalization programs. 
Most of the programs studied, like the Sanliurfa program, focused on countering 
radicalization and terrorist recruitment with the help of family members and friends.  
 
4 Ibid. 
5 Horgan, John and Kurt Braddock. (2010). Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the 
Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs. Terrorism and Political Violence 22(2):267–91 
6 Koehler Daniel & Ehrt, Tobias. (2018). Parents’ Associations, Support Group Interventions and Countering 
Violent Extremism: An Important Step Forward in Combating Violent Radicalization. International Annals of 
Criminology 56(1-2):178-197 
7 Ranstorp, Magnus. & Hyllengren, Peder. (2013). Prevention of Violent Extremism in Third Countries: 
Measures to Prevent Individuals Joining Armed Extremist Groups in Conflict Zones. Stockholm: Center 
for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish National Defence College. 
8 Sikkens, Elga., van San, M., Sieckelinck, S. et al. (2018). Parents’ Perspectives on Radicalization: A 
Qualitative Study. Journal of Child and Family Studies 27, 2276–2284 & Sikkens, Elga., Sieckelinck, Marion, et 
al. (2016). Parental reaction towards radicalization in young people. Child & Family Social Work 22(2):1044-
1053.  
9 Vidino, Lorenzo. 2014. CSS Case Study: Foreign Fighters: An Overview of Responses in Eleven Countries. 
Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. 
10 Gielen, Amy-Jane. (2015). Supporting Families of Foreign Fighters. A Realistic Approach for Measuring the 
Effectiveness. Journal for Deradicalization 2(Spring):21–48. 
11 Koehler, Daniel. (2016). Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering 
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Similar programs focusing on individual disengagement from different terrorist groups 
were also administered in different regions and cities in Turkey. For example, while I was 
working at the Ankara Police Department Counterterrorism and Operations Division between 
2005 and 2010, we ran a similar program, where we targeted students and vulnerable 
populations as a whole, without explicitly reaching out to individuals or their family 
members.  
Another large city in Turkey, Adana, ran a similar project12 via its Police Department. 
While Sanliurfa and Adana project had similarities, the main differences between the two 
programs involved the objectives and methods. The Sanliurfa program targeted every 
individual who was approached by, or had connections with, any terrorist organization 
adopting a “wholesome” approach in an attempt to reach every vulnerable person. 
Additionally, the Sanliurfa program did not focus on deradicalization efforts unless requested 
by the family members or prospective recruits who were participating in the program. 
 
Challenges During the Administration of the Program 
 
During the planning, budgeting, and administrative phase of the program, I was lucky enough 
to work with a police chief and governor who understood the value of the program and 
extended their full support. The support of top government officials was essential for such a 
large-scale project, which directly involved the large population of a city with over two 
million people, especially when there was no previous instance of a program targeting every 
individual who associated with a known terrorist organization.  
While the governor and the top police chief of Sanliurfa, the Central Counterterrorism 
Department in Ankara, the Sanliurfa Education Department, with the teachers and the head 
prosecutor in Sanliurfa, were all positive and supportive, front groups and organizations with 
ties to different terrorist groups were not happy.  
 
12 Bastug, Mehmet, F. & Evlek, Ugur, K. (2016). Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program 
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A few associations in Sanliurfa which were known to have ties to different terrorist 
organizations first tried to undervalue and diminish the effects of the program via press 
releases and negative articles about the program and myself (as the chief of counterterrorism), 
claiming that the program aimed to go after youth so they could be recruited as informants. 
This attempt, although, it caused some confusion among our subjects, did not significantly 
affect the outcome, because we were very forthcoming about our objectives.  
Their next attempt was to visit the governor and pressure him to halt the program, 
claiming that the families and children were being disturbed by the officers Chief Yayla 
dispatched to their homes. The governor, in this case, was very supportive and transparent; he 
told them he was aware of the program and was supporting our efforts. 
Realizing that media pressure and reaching out to the governor was not going to help 
them halt the program, the terrorist organizations filed a judicial complaint and opened a suit 
against me, alleging that the program was not under my defined duties and that the family 
visits were illegal and unconstitutional. At that point, we were almost a year into the program, 
and the results were already positive. The judge overseeing the case requested me to submit 
the details of the program and report the activities of officers involved in the program during 
the family visits. Eventually, the judge ruled against the complaint, citing the Turkish 
Constitution article 58, which is, “The State shall take necessary measures to protect youth 
from addiction to alcohol and drugs, crime, gambling, and similar vices, and ignorance.” 
Losing the case in Sanliurfa did not stop the efforts of the terrorist groups. They 
decided to take the issue to the Turkish Parliament based on the Turkish constitution’s article 
98, the right to submit questions in writing. They requested the Minister of Interior to get 
involved in halting the program I was administering in Sanliurfa and reply to their written 
questions in written form. This request eventually came back to me; I replied in detail and 
sent my responses to the Interior Ministry. The Minister of Interior, at the time, politically 
backed the program and used the justifications in my written report to reply, and that was the 
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Why Families? 
 
I realized from my previous interactions with youth that, without the supervision and 
guidance of their parents or family members, such as older siblings, we would have limited 
success at interrupting the recruitment process. Stopping the radicalization and recruitment of 
young persons proved to be more difficult and challenging for the police and other 
stakeholders if the families were not involved. In addition, particularly in the early stages of 
the terrorist recruitment and ideological indoctrination process, I realized that susceptible 
youth were highly emotional and isolated, which sometimes caused our direct interactions to 
backfire, perhaps even further radicalizing the youth we were trying to communicate with. 
Eventually, I concluded that the police could not continually manage everybody to ensure that 
terrorist recruitment processes were disrupted. I realized that families are the best protectors 
and that they can keep a constant eye on their children. Furthermore, I wanted to make sure 
that through our interactions with the families, we would be able to protect the siblings and 




I established a specific office for the use of the program under the Counterterrorism and 
Operations Division of the Sanliurfa Police Department. A police captain experienced in 
counterterrorism was assigned to lead the newly established office. Ten police officers, six 
male and four females, were chosen to work for the office. Police officers were assigned 
based on specific criteria, including their willingness to work for the program, their 
communication and language skills, their experience with counterterrorism, and the type of 
university degree they had. Most of the assigned officers had bachelor’s degrees in social 
sciences, such as psychology and sociology, or had been teaching in these fields as well 
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We also made sure that at least half of the officers knew the local languages, including 
Arabic and Kurdish, because, in some cases, the mothers did not speak Turkish. The officers 
wore plain clothes, and their police cars were unmarked. A visiting team consisted of three or 
four members, at least one of whom was always a female officer. Before the program started, 
the team members were trained on the objectives, on how to approach the families, on the 
importance of anonymity, and on how to avoid offending the ideologies of the families during 
their interactions. The training involved the establishment of the concept program; discussion 
on how to approach family members and subjects; information on the psychology of the 
youth; and the study of similar best practices. We also made sure that we evaluated the 
program after every visit and had the officers brief us about their interactions with the 
families. Based on the feedback we were receiving through the visits, we fine-tuned our 
approach and continued to discuss and evaluate our procedures.  
One of the main reasons we did not include civilians in our visiting teams at the 
beginning was because of the issue of the trust between the families and visiting teams. In our 
test runs with civilians, the families constantly raised the question, “How can you guarantee 
us that the police will not come after our children?” It was very obvious from the beginning 
that the parents were not comfortable dealing with the civilians without getting a guarantee 
from the police and judiciary to ensure the safety of their children. 
However, after the initial connections, we slowly started to introduce the families and 
the subjects to the social workers and psychologists from the Sanliurfa school district. In most 




The family visits took place at the residences of the parents. We called the parents to request 
appointments. If the teams were unable to reach a family member via a phone call, they would 
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very careful not to stigmatize the families by appearing in their neighborhood, so they tried 
their best in public not to reveal themselves as police officers.  
The motto of the family visits was, “We are here to help you help your children, to 
save them from the hands of terrorist organizations.” We wanted to show empathy and build a 
relationship with the family. Team members never tried to counter ideologies or 
organizations, and always respected the belief systems of the family. Excessive care was 
taken to avoid offending and alienating the family by talking about its ideology; as part of this 
strategy, the visiting teams refrained from mentioning the activities of the terrorist 
organizations in question.  
In the beginning, discussions and communications would not involve any 
deradicalization activities, and our message was simple and clear: “Everyone is free to believe 
what they would like to believe, as long as their activities do not involve violence.” This 
ideologically non-confrontational and polemic-free approach was essential in our visits, 
because our main objective for the first step was not to change the ideology of the family 
members or their children, but to save their children from becoming members of terrorist 
organizations.  
Because the Sanliurfa program was not a deradicalization program, we did not involve 
ourselves in any ideological aspects of the subjects. In most cases, the families did not request 
us to work with them on ideological issues. Consequently, we did not collaborate with any 
authorities, such as the Turkish Diyanet.  
Family visits usually lasted about an hour, and sometimes more, depending on the 
conversations with the family members. Team members did not start to talk about the 
objective of their visits directly; instead, they would assure the parents that they were not 
there to carry out any police investigations or to arrest anybody. Then, depending on the 
psychological and general atmosphere of the visits, officers would explain to the parents that a 
terrorist organization member was in touch with one or more of their children and that we 
wanted to intervene, so that we could work with the parents to save their children. At this 
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• As the police department, in particular as the counterterrorism police (TEM), we are 
not carrying out any investigation targeting your child. 
• There has not been any official recordkeeping process involving your child.  
• There is no ongoing judicial process regarding your child, and we are here specifically 
to ensure that there is not going to be an investigation.  
• We are not here to collect any information or intelligence, and we are not going to ask 
any questions about the activities of your child or make any requests to acquire 
information or details about your child’s interactions with the terrorist organization 
members in question. 
• We would like to work with you so that we can help you to prevent your child from 
becoming a terrorist organization member in the future. At this point, your child has 
not become a member; however, we have indications that he or she might be a target 
and that the recruitment process might have started.  
• This is a voluntary process, and we are not going to ask you to take any action you 
don’t want to. However, we will do our best to assist you to reverse the radicalization 
and possible recruitment process targeting your child.  
 
As can be seen in the data in the next section, most families volunteered to work with 
us so that they could get professional help. At this stage, the parents were encouraged not to 
confront their child and not to carry out any action that would upset their child. We did not 
want the youth in question, who had associated themselves with a terrorist organization but 
had not yet carried out any violent activities, to run away from home because of our visits or 
because they were scared of the reactions of their parents.  
Team members worked with the parents on how to deal with the situation for each 
case and did not attempt to meet with a child unless they were asked to do so, particularly at 
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visit the prevention office if they wanted to consult with team members at the Police 
Department. At this point, only the team members interacted with the families; however, after 
the initial connections, social workers, psychologists, and teachers were involved in the 
process, on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, upon the first visit, the prevention process 
involving family members and parents started, and the team members continued to work with 
the families to ensure that their children understood what was happening and would consider 
cutting their ties with recruiters or others associated with terrorist organizations. 
 
Who Were Visited? 
 
This section defines and describes the four categories of youth who were targeted in the 
program. 
The main criterion for including individuals and families in this program was 
association with a known and judicially recognized terrorist organization in Turkey. The 
individuals the Sanliurfa program had connections with one of the following terrorist 
organizations: the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), Turkish Hezbollah, Salafi Jihadist groups 
(including different al-Qaeda affiliates and ISIS), and a small number of leftist terrorist 
organizations, including the DHKP/C (the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) and 
TIKKO (the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist–Leninist). The Sanliurfa program never 
focused on political opposition groups and had no political agenda. This was one of the 
reasons the Erdogan government halted the program in 2014 and eliminated the office set up 
to administer it, as it was deemed not to serve his political agenda.  
 
Prospective Terrorist Recruits 
The most frequently visited group consisted of prospective terrorist recruits. The 
members of this group were identified based on counterterrorism police work and interactions 
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approached by, known terrorist affiliates was considered to be in this group. We did not carry 
out any special investigations as the counterterrorism (CT) division but took note of the 
names of youth who came to our attention during CT investigations and operations. Our 
foremost objective was to reach out to the families in the very early stages of the interactions 
between the youth and known terrorist affiliates, to interrupt indoctrination and recruitment 
efforts before the recruiters could establish a strong bond with, or radicalize, the youth.   
 
Youth Interacting with Known Terrorist-Affiliated Organizations 
The second group consisted of youth who were already interacting with known 
terrorist-affiliated organizations. These organizations included foundations, associations, 
neighborhood study centers, bookstores, and any front organization that terrorist groups 
would employ to attract recruits. For example, one of the most frequented terrorism-affiliated 
organizations was a youth center operated by the affiliates of a terrorist organization in 
Sanliurfa, where they were able to attract high school and university students to a variety of 
activities, including music concerts, study groups, courses on subjects such as guitar playing, 
and arts and crafts. 
 
Families Whose Children Were in Prison Due to Terrorism-Related Offenses 
The third group comprised families whose children were in prison due to terrorism-
related offenses. Our primary focus with these families was to prevent the radicalization and 
recruitment of the siblings and other relatives of the imprisoned terrorists. Similar visits took 
place after a youth was released from prison or detention, to convey the message that “we are 
here to help if you need us.”  
 
Families Whose Children Were Foreign Fighters 
The fourth group was made up of families whose children were foreign fighters or 
who were known to be active members of terrorist organizations and who were hiding from 
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group were not alienated and that the siblings and other relatives of the recruits were not also 
under threat of terrorist recruitment.  
Family visits covering the last two groups were conducted regardless of known threats 
of radicalization or recruitment, to make sure that the families did not feel alienated and that 
the youth were secure from being recruited, because the data presented in the next section, 
and our experiences, suggested that the siblings and relatives of known terrorists were more 
intensively targeted for recruitment than others. 
 
After the Visits 
 
Initial family visits were just the beginning of the interaction process with the parents and 
other family members. In most cases, the families followed up and requested to meet again, 
and in other cases, the team members re-contacted the families to see if they had any 
questions or if they needed any assistance. Our interactions with the youth usually started 
during this phase, and the team members tried to maintain contact with the family members, 
regardless of their situation. In general, the parents either brought their children to the 
Counterterrorism Division or encouraged their children to visit the team members. At this 
stage, the officers never attempted to question the ideology or operations of terrorist 
organizations, but tried to maintain positive communications with the youth. As most of the 
youth were students, we began to offer several programs for them as we started to interact. 
These programs provided us with an opportunity to introduce the families and their children 
to government- and NGO-affiliated social workers and teachers. Our after-visit activities 
continued on a year-round basis; they are summarized in the discussion that follows.  
Youth activities related to terrorist organizations were controlled on a regular basis by 
the counterterrorism division. We tried to make sure that the participants in the program were 
cutting their ties with the terrorist organization members. Our message concerning the 
importance of dissociating from terrorist organization members and entities was conveyed 
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when they met with the youth after the family visits, unless the youth wanted to talk about it. 
Instead, we directed them to a variety of activities that would help them in their careers or 
education and at the same time provide a positive and constructive context in which our team 
members, social workers, and teachers had opportunities to connect and communicate with 
the youth. In addition to those who were under the threat of terrorist recruitment, their 
siblings, family members, and close friends were also invited to these activities, provided they 
were of the appropriate age.   
In the same vein, we arranged free courses and customized training for the youth. The 
courses focused on helping students get good scores on the central university placement test, 
and the training courses were available to provide different skill sets, with certifications, so 
the students would have a better chance of finding a job after graduation. The customized 
training courses focused on a variety of subjects, which were provided by the Sanliurfa 
Education Department, and led to certification for the occupations of auto mechanic, 
electrician, computer repair person, plumber, construction worker, hairdresser, and tailor. 
After the students graduated from these courses, we helped them to find jobs if they wanted to 
work.  
In addition to the education and training programs, we offered sightseeing outings. 
Usually, on weekends, we took the students to tourist sites and natural attractions around 
Sanliurfa. Our team members accompanied the youth during these activities, and all expenses 
were paid through the program. Furthermore, we started to invite the youth to the police 
department sports arena and playgrounds, and our team members and other police officers 
played soccer with them.   
All these activities were provided free of charge and on a voluntary basis. Students’ 
parents provided written permission for their children to get involved in the programs. Our 
team members never attempted to elicit any information from the youth who participated. Our 
main objective was to provide an opportunity for the youth to observe and to come to 
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radicalization were only covered if a student wanted to talk about them, and in those cases, 
the discussions and consultations happened one-on-one and not in the presence of others. 
 
Program Metrics, Data and Method 
 
Data Sources 
This section reports on some of the statistics collected during the Sanliurfa program, in 
order to inform the reader about the subjects, their families and general performance metrics. 
During the administration of the program, I attempted to learn more about the subjects 
through observations, evaluations done by the officers in the program, and the metrics that 
were collected. This section will present some of the reasons for why adolescents in particular 
might be attracted to terrorist organizations, and correlations between families and regional 
demographics.  
The data for this section were collected from interviews with individuals who were 
targeted by different terrorist organizations for recruitment purposes and with their family 
members. The data consist of the results of face-to-face interviews conducted during the first 
year of the Sanliurfa Family Visits Program between August 2010 and August 2011. While 
the program continued until mid-2014 and interacted with almost 2,000 subjects, the first 
phase of the interviews and family visits included 479 different families and potential recruits, 
and of these contacts, 371 were face-to-face, and 98 were conducted by phone.  
This section is based on all of the face-to-face interviews and field observations 
recorded during the family visits. No sampling was done. An analysis of the results from the 
second phase of the program, based on data from the 2011-2014 family visits, will also be 
published, and the results compared to those of this study. The families were openly told that 
we would anonymously record information about family demographics, including education 
levels and occupations of the family members. No paperwork or official documentation was 
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department. We also realized at the beginning that implementation of an official recording or 
bookkeeping process would reduce our chances, since, in most cases, the family members 
were either illiterate or did not want to fill out or sign any documentation.  
 
Hypotheses 
My first hypothesis while designing the project was that most families, mothers, 
fathers, brothers, sisters, and close relatives would not want their loved ones to become 
involved in a terrorist organization or become terrorists, even if they shared the same ideology 
with a terrorist organization, or even if they secretly or openly supported that terrorist 
organization. If given the opportunity and support, the families would do their best to save 
their children.  
The second hypothesis was that most parents or family members would not be aware 
of their children's interactions with terrorist recruiters or other entities. 
The third hypothesis was that early intervention through families could deter the 
recruitment of future terrorists, by persuading them to take sides against radicalization and 
violence. The involvement of families in the prevention of terrorist recruitment, particularly in 
the early stages of the process, has greater advantages than other forms of counterterrorism 
tactics, as successful interventions can easily halt radicalization and recruitment, and, in the 
end, directly and indirectly reduce the threat of terrorism. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality  
The data presented in this study were collected during the interviews and included the 
field notes of the interviewers, who spent hours with the families and their children. 
Anonymization of the data was ensured from the beginning of the recording phase, real names 
and addresses were never recorded, private and sensitive information about the families and 
their children were not included in the data, and the interviews were not video-taped or audio-
recorded. The interviewees were provided with the survey questions if they agreed to respond, 
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survey forms, the experts who visited the families recorded their observations and the 
narratives of their subjects by taking notes.13  
The families and other subjects who were present during the visits were assured of the 
confidentiality of the visits and the recordkeeping. To ensure confidentiality and promote 
rapport, experts explained to the families that their and their children’s identities, and any 
relevant information that could reveal their identities, were never going to be recorded or 
revealed in any fashion.14 For example, the recorded data, in addition to not including real 
names or addresses, did not include tell-tale information such as building or place names, nor 
the names of terrorist organizations or sub-groups, affiliated centers, associations, 
foundations, publication houses (which are often frequented by members of terrorist 
organizations), party buildings, representatives, or known businesses. For this reason, the 
analysis presented in this study will not reveal associations with specific terrorist 
organizations, but instead will describe a general approach and examination based on the 
Sanliurfa region.  
 
Collected Data  
The following are the variables and data points we collected through the surveys and 
through our observations during the visits.  
• Residence: city, sub-city or town, region, and neighborhood 
• Parents’ occupations  
• Father’s education level 
• Mother’s education level 
• Family income 
• Whether the family contained a government employee or civil servant  
 
13 Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
14 Wiles, Rose., Crow, Graham., Heath, Sue., & Charles, Vikki. (2008). The Management of Confidentiality and 
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• Number of siblings (immediate family) 
• The parents’ approach to terrorist organizations  
• Parents’ prior knowledge of their children’s interactions with terrorist organization 
members 
• Parents’ attitude towards the visiting team 
• Parents’ attitude towards the police in general 
• Parents’ level of satisfaction with the visits 
• Parents’ perspective on terrorist organizations. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
Residence: City, Sub-City or Town, Region, and Neighborhood 
At the beginning of this program, place of residence was considered one of the main 
factors in terrorist recruitment and radicalization. One of the main reasons we focused on the 
influence of the neighborhoods is that terrorist recruiters and close family members associated 
with a terrorist organization could easily approach subjects and establish bonds due to 
geographical proximity, the fact that they were in the same family, or the fact that they had a 
variety of opportunities to spend time with the potential recruit. As a counterterrorism 
professional, I frequently observed during my investigations that terrorist recruiters reached 
out to their family members or close friends first, simply because they tended to trust them 
more and had ample ways to reach them for ideological indoctrination and recruitment.15   
Terrorist recruiters need alone-time with their subjects, and often the suburbs of cities 
or small neighborhoods (where young people can interact closely on the streets, on 
playgrounds, in their local schools and mosques, or in their homes) can provide opportunities 
for ideological indoctrination. Local schools in different neighborhoods also play a critical 
 
15 Yayla, Ahmet. S., (2001). A Case Study of Leftist Terrorism in Turkey. Retrieved from 
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role in recruitment. High schools and universities, especially, can provide fertile ground.16 A 
well-trained and established recruiter can reach out to hundreds of young people during 
school hours or after school, and often neither the teachers nor the families red flag these 
connections as a threat if they have no prior knowledge of them.17  
For example, Eyyubiye was one of the neighborhoods that furnished a high number of 
interviewees for this study. In one of the Eyyubiye high schools, a fourteen-year-old senior 
female middle-school student was able to radicalize and recruit up to fifty students in her 
school, which had a population of over one thousand students. While the police were aware of 
the situation and were trying to intervene through the school administration, teachers, and 
more important, the student’s family, the process proved to be extremely difficult, and the 
combined efforts of the stakeholders failed to stop her. Her parents were frustrated and told 
the officers, “they were unable to stop their daughter, and she was not listening to them.” 
Prior to this incident, the Turkish government had passed a law limiting the police 
investigation of children until after the age of fifteen, and even the prosecutors lacked the 
legal power to arrest the student to stop the activity. Given the situation, we had to wait until 
the student recruiter was fifteen years old, and meanwhile, we visited the families of the 
students she was interacting with to reduce further damage. 
  In keeping with this, a previous study conducted by the author in Turkey18 revealed 
that a majority of terrorist recruitment took place through former close connections of the 
recruiters and their subjects. In 2004, when the author asked “through which mediums 
terrorist recruiters had established initial contact with their subjects,” 35% of the respondents 
indicated it was through their close friends, and 26% responded that it was through one of 
their relatives.  
 
16 De Silva, Samantha. (2019). Role of Education in the Prevention of Violent Extremism. Retrieved from  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/448221510079762554/120997-WP-revised-PUBLIC-Role-of-
Education-in-Prevention-of-Violence-Extremism-Final.pdf (05/27/2020). 
17 Coppock, Vicki. (2014). Can you Spot a Terrorist in Your Classroom?’ Problematising the Recruitment of 
Schools to the ‘War on Terror’ in the United Kingdom. Global Studies of Childhood. 4(2):115-125.  
18 Yayla, Ahmet. S., (2005). Terrorism as a social information entity: A model for early intervention. Retrieved 
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Friend 24 35.3 
Relative 18 26.5 
Terrorist Publications  11 16.1 
Prison-Related 5 7.4 
Terrorist Associations 4 5.9 
Social / Mental 
Problems 2 2.9 
Sympathy or Idealism 2 2.9 
Demonstration 1 1.5 
Loss/Arrest of Close 
Circle 1 1.5 
Total 68 100 
 
A study analyzing the Sinjar reports of al-Qaeda foreign fighter recruits reached 
similar results. The study examined how 177 Sinjar recruits had encountered their recruiters. 
According to the data, 97% of the respondents had connected through a social (84%), family 
(6%), or religious (6%) affiliation. For instance, the terrorists mentioned “through a brother” 
(social setting), “through my cousin” (family setting), and “through the mosque” (religious 
setting).19  
 
Table 2. Sinjar Reports on al-Qaeda (Valid N = 177) 
 
19 Watts, Clinton., (2008). Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment 
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Recruited 
through Frequency % 
Social 149 84.2 
Religious 11 6.2 
Family 11 6.2 
Internet 6 3.4 
Total 177 100 
 
Another important empirical study carried out by Niyazi Ekici20 in 2008, examining 
the relationship between the types of contact and the terrorists’ status, found similar results 
regarding the role of friends and family members in terrorist recruitment. The Ekici study 
found that among convicted terrorists in Turkey, 67% had been recruited by their friends, 
12% by a relative, and 14% by organizational associations. Among the prospective terrorists 
who had not yet been arrested, 35% indicated that it was their friends who had introduced 
them to the terrorist organization, 26% said it was through one of their relatives, and 22% 
through a terrorist organization. According to this study, altogether, half of the terrorists had 










20 Ekici, Niyazi., (2009). The Dynamics of Terrorist Recruitment: The Case of the Revolutionary People's 
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Table 3. The Relationship Between Type of Contact and Terrorist Status 
Contact Type (%) 
Candidate 
Terrorists 




(N = 70) 
 Total 
Friend 35 67 50 
Relative 26 12 20 
Org. association 22 14 18 
Other 16 7 12 
Total     100 
 
In the case of the Sanliurfa program, the majority of the families visited lived in the 
suburbs of the city. The Eyyubiye region accounted for 57% of the families visited, and the 
Suleymaniye region accounted for 29%. The Sanliurfa city center, where the Yenisehir 
neighborhood is located, accounted for 12% of the families. The Viransehir, Hilvan, and 
Bozova regions accounted for only 2%, most likely because those towns are far away from 
the city center, and there is no municipal public transportation to those locations. Another 
factor that during the first year of the program, the focus was on the city center; the remote 
towns were included only during the second year. Eyyubiye and Suleymaniye in Sanliurfa are 
considered suburbs of the city, and the crime rates are considerably higher in these two 
regions compared to the rest of the neighborhoods in Sanliurfa. For example, the majority of 
the murder, aggravated assault, and theft incidents in Sanliurfa in 2011 and 2012 happened in 
these neighborhoods. In addition to the crime rates, the residents of these neighborhoods have 
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Eyyubiye 207 57 
Suleymaniye 108 29 
Yenisehir 45 12 
Viransehir 3 1 
Hilvan 2 1 
Bozova 1 0 
Total 366 100 
 
Parents’ Occupations 
Almost all of the mothers of the participants were homemakers, and some of the 
mothers also worked on farms. One-third of the fathers were workers; around 10% of them 
were deceased at the time of the program. One of the common characteristics of jobs in the 
Sanliurfa region is long working hours for laborers, shopkeepers, and drivers. Visiting teams 
observed during their interactions that sometimes it was difficult to reach out to fathers, due to 
their working hours and conditions; often, they would leave home early and return late at 
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Table 5. Fathers’ Occupations (Valid N = 310) 
Fathers’ Occupations 
Number of 
Fathers  % 
Worker 102 33 
Tradesmen/shopkeeper 48 16 
Deceased 36 12 
Unemployed 29 9 
Farmer 29 9 
Retired 21 7 
Driver 17 5 
Civil servant/white 
collar 16 5 
Security guard 7 2 
Livestock dealer 5 2 
Total 310 100 
 
Parents’ Education Levels: Fathers 
Only one-third of the families provided data on the father’s education level. Among 
the responding fathers, there were only three university and four high-school graduates. More 
than one-third of the fathers had never attended school in their lives, and they did not know 
how to read or write. Forty-three percent knew how to read and write but had not graduated 
from an elementary school; only 25% had graduated from elementary school. There were no 
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Fathers  % 
Illiterate 34 29 
Literate 50 43 
Elementary School 
Graduate 25 22 
High School Graduate 4 3 
Bachelor’s Degree 3 3 
Total 116 100 
 
Among the participants, the fathers’ levels of education were significantly lower than 
those of the general population of Sanliurfa and Turkey. The Turkish Government Statistical 
Institute (TUIK)21 publishes the results of countrywide demographic surveys of a number of 
variables every year. The levels of education for the Sanliurfa city center, where the family 
visits were conducted, were drawn from 2012 TUIK statistics. The general education levels 
for Turkey included males and females combined; therefore, it was not possible to distinguish 








21 TUIK. (2013). Secilmis Gostergelerle Sanliurfa 2012. Ankara, Turkey.  
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Table 7. Male Education Levels: Turkey, Sanliurfa, and the Research Sample 
Education Levels Program % Sanliurfa Center % 
Turkish Male and 
Female % 
 
Illiterate   29 4 5 
Literate 43 11 21 
Elementary School 
Graduate 
 22 50 41 
Middle-School 
Graduate 0 3.5 4 
High-School Graduate 3 17.5 18 
Bachelor’s degree 3 9 8 
Graduate Degree 0 5 3 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Mothers’ Education Levels 
The education levels of the mothers who responded to the survey were also 
significantly lower than those of the general populations of Sanliurfa and Turkey. Two-thirds 
of the mothers did not know how to read or write. Moreover, some did not even know 
Turkish, and the visiting officers had to communicate with them in Kurdish or Arabic. Sixteen 
percent knew how to read and write, and 13% had finished elementary school. Only four of 
the responding mothers were high-school graduates, and there were no college graduates in 
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Mothers  % 
Illiterate 79 68 
Literate 18 16 
Elementary School 
Graduate 15 13 
High-School Graduate 4 3 
Bachelor’s degree 0 0 
Total 116 100 
 
The levels of education for the Sanliurfa females did not reflect those of the general 
Turkish population; their was a considerable education gap. The mothers who responded to 
the survey had significantly lower levels than those of both Sanliurfa and Turkey. For 
example, while the illiteracy rate for Turkey is less than 5%, it was 19% for the females living 
in Sanliurfa and 68% for the female respondents altogether, which is at least 3.5 times more 
than Sanliurfa city center and 14 times more than the average Turkish illiteracy rate. In regard 
to the other levels of education, the females in our survey scored significantly lower than both 
the Sanliurfa and Turkey averages, indicating that, in general, the levels of education among 
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Turkish Male and 
Female % 
Illiterate   68 19 5 
Literate 16 22 21 
Elementary School 
Graduate 
 13 35 41 
Middle-School Graduate 0 1.5 4 
High-School Graduate 3 9 18 
Bachelor’s Degree 0 4.5 8 
Graduate Degree 0 0 3 
Unknown 0 9 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Family Income 
Counterterrorism scholars have studied and debated over the role of income in whether 
or not one becomes a member of a terrorist organization, often without arriving at significant 
associations.23 We also wanted to analyze the role of family income in the lives of the 
vulnerable youth with whom we were interacting during the Sanliurfa program. A total of 
21% of the respondents indicated that they did not have a fixed income, or that their income 
level was extremely low, even by Sanliurfa standards. Some families had no work and were 
relying on government aid. Almost half of the respondents were in low-income families that 
were struggling to support their family members. These families, for the most part, had fathers 
who were laborers or farmers who worked long hours. Nineteen percent of the responding 
 
23 Lee, Alexander. (2011). Who Becomes a Terrorist? Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence. 
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families had mid-level incomes, and only 14% indicated that they had decent incomes and 
were comfortably supporting their family members.  
 
Table 10. Family Income (Valid N = 207) 





No income (0-500) 44 21 
Low (501-1,000) 95 46 
Middle (1,001-2,000) 39 19 
High (2,001 and up) 29 14 
Total 207 100 
 
Whether the Family Contained a Government Employee or Civil Servant 
During my interactions with different terrorist organization members over the years, I 
observed that many of those who joined a terrorist organization did not have a relative who 
worked for the government in any capacity—as a teacher, an officer in a government or 
municipal agency, a member of the military, or a law enforcement officer—or in any 
contracted government job. We wanted to include this question in our survey because we 
wanted to analyze the effects on terrorist recruitment of having a family member working as a 
civil servant, either directly or indirectly (e.g., as a contractor). Ninety percent of the 
responders indicated that they had no relatives or family members working for the 
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Table 11. Participant Families Containing a Civil Servant (Valid N = 352) 
Civil Servant in the 
Family Number of Families  % 
No 317 90 
Yes 35 10 
Total 352 100 
 
Number of Siblings 
One of the first observations I made when I started to work in Sanliurfa was the fact 
that the majority of the suspects had many siblings, often more than ten. In fact, it wasn’t 
surprising for our officers to interview suspects who had over twenty brothers and sisters. 
Once, during an interview, a suspect told me he had twenty-seven siblings from the same 
father and mother. The number of siblings is important in analyzing terrorist recruitment, for 
two major reasons. The first is that, as the number of siblings increases, the amount of time 
and the financial resources a family can dedicate to each child may decrease. The second is 
based on the previous studies I carried out, which indicated that over a quarter of new terrorist 
recruits were pulled into terrorist organizations by close family members, often by brothers or 
sisters.24  
There are ample examples of family members, often siblings without prior ideological 
or organizational affiliations, being lured by terrorist recruitment. For example, Salma and 
Zahra Halane, twin sisters from Manchester, traveled to Turkey from the UK to join ISIS in 
the summer of 2014. Apparently, their elder brother Ahmed was already in Raqqa; he had 
joined ISIS prior to their arrival. Ahmed successfully arranged for the twin sisters to move to 
the caliphate by meeting them at the Turkish border.25  
 
 
24 Yayla, Ahmet. S., (2005). Terrorism as a social information entity: A model for early intervention. Retrieved 
from https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4800/ (05/27/2020). 
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The leveraging of family affiliations does not end with recruitment or direct 
radicalization; it can provide support for terrorists through a broad array of activities, 
including lodging them, financing them, harboring group members, or unknowingly and 
indirectly supporting their organizations. For instance, during an operation against the leftist 
terrorist organization DHKP/C in 1997 in Ankara, one of the suspects revealed that he had 
hidden explosives in his older sister’s home in the suburbs of Ankara. When the older sister 
was confronted, she revealed that her brother gave her a package and told her he would come 
back to pick it up later. When we looked at the package, we realized that it was a manual 
weight scale. While the scale looked normal from the outside, after careful investigation, we 
found that several sticks of dynamite were carefully hidden inside.  
A more recent incident involving an ISIS commander in Raqqa happened in 2017. 
Tarek Khayat, an Australian senior ISIS member in Raqqa, reached out to his brothers, 
Khaled and Mahmoud Khayat, in Australia; they had no prior connections to ISIS and were 
not known to have any association with ISIS other than their older brother’s involvement with 
the organization. However, Tarek convinced them to carry out a plot in Australia and even 
shipped the explosives from Turkey to Australia to make sure the attack would succeed.26  
Earlier in my career, when I started to work in counterterrorism, I realized that family 
members were under the direct threat of involving themselves with a terrorist organization 
through their siblings, based on a variety of factors, including trust between siblings, 
emotional bonds, ideological indoctrination inside the family, or simply an inability to say no 
to close kin. I have seen younger brothers and sisters being lured into terrorist organizations 
even without much indoctrination, often because their brothers or sisters had been arrested. 
On the other hand, while having a sibling associated with a terrorist organization might help 
with recruitment within a family, the reverse is also possible; that is, if there are disapproving 
siblings who are not affiliated with a terrorist organization, they can hinder recruitment 
through peer pressure and social control. For all these reasons, I wanted to analyze the 
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relationship between terrorist recruitment and the number of the siblings in a family. One 
important aspect of Sanliurfa is that people there tend to have larger families than the rest of 
the country.  
In fact, the families we visited had considerably high numbers of children. Seventy-
three percent had between four and ten. The highest numbers of siblings in a single-family 
were 21 and 22. Only 15% of the families had one to three children; 15% had five children, 
14% had eight, 10% had six or seven, 9% had four, and 8% had nine. Four percent of the 
families had eleven to thirteen children.  
 
Table 12. Number of Siblings in the Families (Valid N = 337) 
Number of Siblings 
Number of 
Families  % 
1 10 3% 
2 13 4% 
3 28 8% 
4 30 9% 
5 52 15% 
6 33 10% 
7 33 10% 
8 46 14% 
9 27 8% 
10 24 7% 
11 14 4% 
12 1 0% 
13 12 4% 
14 4 1% 
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16 5 1% 
17 1 1% 
18 1 1% 
19 0 0% 
20 0 0% 
21 1 1% 
22 1 1% 
Total 337 100% 
 
The Parents’ Approach to Terrorist Organizations  
The parents’ approach to terrorist organizations was included among the variables for 
the data collection because I wanted to measure the influences of parents’ affiliations with 
terrorist organizations on their children’s radicalization or recruitment. The majority of the 
families responded that they had had no prior affiliation with any terrorist organization and 
that they did not support terrorist organizations in any capacity. It would be ambitious to 
expect family members to reveal any connection to a terrorist organization when responding 
to a survey being conducted by police officers, yet we also cross-checked to see whether or 
not any affiliation had existed before the visits.  
Ten percent of the families responded that they were sympathetic towards the ideology 
of a terrorist organization but that they never involved themselves in its activities. These 
families fell into a category where the children assumed an ideological identification to a 
terrorist organization and its indoctrination practices through interactions within their family, 
although the family did not directly support that terrorist organization. Three percent of the 
families were known to be supporters of terrorist organizations. Their support usually 
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My assumption at the start of the program was that family attitudes towards terrorist 
ideologies would be a catalyzing factor, and that many of the families we visited would have 
an ideology close to the terrorist ideologies their children were being pulled into, based on my 
previous study in Ankara of the members of the leftist DHKP/C terrorist organization. 
According to that study, over 60% of the arrested DHKP/C members’ families believed in 
some variety of the Marxist and Leninist ideologies adopted by terrorist organizations—a 
clear indication of how the families’ prior connections to an ideology increased the likelihood 
of terrorist recruitment.27 However, the Sanliurfa study, which was carried out almost ten 
years later, indicated that only 13% of the families supported the ideology of the terrorist 
organization recruiting their children.  
 




Families  % 
No affiliation 309 86 
Sympathetic 36 10 
Supports 10 3 
Unknown 2 1 
Total 357 100 
 
Parents’ Prior Knowledge of their Children’s Interactions with Terrorist Organization 
Members 
Terrorist organizations and recruiters do not want the subjects’ families to know about 
the interactions with their children, in order to ensure that the indoctrination and recruitment 
process does not get interrupted, and more important, that the families do not go to the 
authorities to file complaints and reveal the recruiters’ activities. Several terrorist 
 
27 Yayla, Ahmet. S., (2005). Terrorism as a social information entity: A model for early intervention. Retrieved 
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organizations adopted similar approaches to preserving the discipline of secrecy from the 
beginning of the recruitment process. In efforts not to alert the families, secrecy is usually 
achieved through cover activities; the type depends on the region and age of the targets, and 
the activities often involve sports, studying, shopping, or sleepovers. For example, the leftist 
DHKP/C was very keen on the secrecy of their recruiters’ interactions with their targets, and 
they often warned the youth they were approaching to hide their relationships with them. 
Alternatively, the recruiters used different covers or middle agents so the families would not 
suspect their intentions, such as neighborhood friends, teachers of study groups, and sports or 
music instructors.28  
Similarly, al-Qaeda tends to be very careful during the recruitment process. In addition 
to applying several layers of secrecy from the beginning of their recruitment, they also teach 
their new subjects or members the “hear and obey” concept, which requires all members to 
carry out the orders of their emirs, regardless of the circumstances. The concept of “hear and 
obey,” based on Salafi Jihadi teachings, ensures that new organization members will carry out 
the orders of their recruiters, which often include “keeping their interactions secret and not 
talking to anyone, including their family members, about the organization and what they are 
doing.” This concept is based on a saying of the Prophet Muhammed, to pledge “allegiance to 
the Messenger [sws] to hear and obey [a Muslim ruler] whether it is convenient or 
inconvenient for us, and at our times of difficulty or ease … ,” making it mandatory for every 
member of the terrorist organization to follow the orders of their emirs as a religious rule, and 
not to receive them simply as orders.29 As a matter of fact, followers are forced to carry out 
the orders of their emirs as though the orders are a religious duty, and those who 
underestimate this rule or refuse to obey are harshly disciplined. 
 
28 Yayla, Ahmet. S., (2001). A Case Study of Leftist Terrorism in Turkey. Retrieved from 
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc2826/ (05/27/2020). 
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In addition to ensuring the secrecy of interactions and connections through the 
teachings of secrecy and the hear-and-obey concept, many terrorist organizations also start a 
process of “isolation” in an effort to retain new members, allowing them to interact only with 
their recruiters and like people, so they are not negatively influenced. Terrorist organizations 
isolate their members from the outside world not only through personal interactions, but also 
through what they read, watch, or listen to and through those they interact with, similar to 
reducing the risk of defection or influence by counter-propaganda activities. For example, 
Salafi Jihadi terrorist organizations, in this manner, often require their new members “not to 
involve themselves with the teachings and literature of other Islamic traditions and not to 
communicate or discuss their ideologies with others even if they are family members.”30 
For the reasons listed above, a question was included in the survey of the Sanliurfa 
program to determine whether the parents had prior knowledge of their children's activities 
involving terrorist recruiters. The responses of the parents for this variable were not 
surprising; approximately 88% of the families stated that they were unaware of their 
children’s ties with terrorist recruiters or entities. The responses reaffirmed one of the main 
hypotheses of the Sanliurfa program, as we suspected that most of the families were unaware 
of their children's involvement. 
 
Table 14. Parents’ Prior Knowledge of their Children’s Interactions with Terrorist 
Organization Members (Valid N = 355) 
 
 Number of Families  % 
No 312 88 
Yes 43 12 
Total 355 100 
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Parents’ Attitude Towards the Visiting Team  
Offering hospitality and welcoming the visiting team members, based on the Turkish 
customs in the region, were good signs of how well the visiting teams were building rapport 
with the families and how well our communications with the parents were being received. 
This variable was not among the survey questions; rather, the team members recorded their 
observations after each visit and indicated in their reports whether or not the families had 
welcomed them. Based on established Turkish customs, team members offered small gifts to 
the families they were visiting. The gifts included tricks or toys for the children, live flower 
arrangements for the house, and refreshments for the adults. Depending on the family’s 
situation, food boxes also were offered.  
How they were welcomed was an important indicator for the team, who were able to 
adjust their tone and approach when communicating based on how they perceived the attitude 
of the parents.   
This variable consisted of four categories or degrees of acceptance. Team members 
observed a warm and sincere reception from the families 84% of the time. This meant they 
were welcomed inside the house without any conditions after they introduced themselves and 
showed their badges. Families in this category also accepted the gifts the teams brought with 
them. The second category was observed when the families were skeptical as introductions 
were made, but the teams were welcomed inside, and the families accepted the gifts 10% of 
the time. Often, as the conversation continued, and the families better understood the 
objectives of the visit, their skepticism diminished over time. The third category was observed 
when the families were not welcoming after the initial introductions at the door; however, 
when the teams conveyed the objective of the visits in a detailed way, the families eventually 
accepted the officers inside the house, accepted the gifts, and decided to cooperate after 
understanding the situation. The final category involved families who did not accept the 
visiting team members and did not invite them in, but turned them away from the door and 
never accepted the gifts. While there were only five such occasions, accounting for only 1% 
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based on prior police work, the families had close associations with a terrorist organization or 
its ideology.  
 
Table 15. Parents’ Attitude Towards the Visiting Team (Valid N = 354) 




Warm and sincere 298 84.2 
Skeptical and accepted the gifts 36 10.2 
Negative manner but accepted the gifts 15 4.2 
Negative manner and did not accept the 
gifts 5 1.4 
Total 354 100 
 
Parents’ Attitude Towards the Police in General 
This question was included in the survey to measure the attitudes of the families 
towards the police in general. One of the reasons we wanted to measure this was due to 
alienation and distancing resulting from the animosity of terrorist organizations towards the 
government in general and the police in particular. It was a common tactic among many 
terrorist organizations to distance prospective recruits from the government and portray law 
enforcement as the enemy, in order to ensure the isolation of the youth and prevent defections. 
Portraying the government and law enforcement as the enemy reinforces in- and out-group 
boundaries, which is a requirement for the radicalization process through extremism.31    
Of the responding families, 82% indicated that they were open to interactions with the 
police and that they had no biases. Eleven percent of the respondents indicated that they were 
skeptical about the police, an indication of reduced trust. Five percent of the families 
indicated that they simply did not trust the police and that they were suspicious about law 
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enforcement in general. And finally, 2% of the respondents indicated that they were 
completely closed to the police and would not want to interact with law enforcement. The 
findings for this variable coincide with those for the previous variable, which involved the 
observations of the visiting teams about the parents’ attitudes towards the visiting officers.  
 
Table 16. Parents’ Attitude Towards the Police (Valid N = 361) 
Parents’ Attitude Towards the 
Police Number of Households % 
Open 295 82 
Skeptical 42 11 
Suspicious 17 5 
Closed 7 2 
Total 361 100 
 
Parents’ Level of Satisfaction with the Visits 
With this question, we wanted to determine if the families were satisfied with the 
visits. The initial responses were important, so that we could gauge how attitudes would 
change over time, because teams often continued to meet with the parents and invite them to 
their offices and to programs that were designed to assist both the youth under threat of 
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Table 17. Parents’ Satisfaction with the Visits (Valid N = 360) 
 





Satisfied 322 89 
Undecided 34 10 





Parents’ Perspective on Terrorist Organizations 
The final question in our survey was asked to measure the parents’ perceptions of the 
terrorist organizations their children were involved or associated with. The names of terrorist 
organizations were not included in the survey questions, so as not to alienate the family 
members.  
 
Table 18. Parents’ Perspective on Terrorist Organizations (Valid N = 361) 
Parents’ Perspective on Terrorist 
Organizations 
Number of 
Households  % 
Not supportive 309 86 
Sympathetic 36 10 
Supportive 10 3 
No answer 2 1 
Total 357 100 
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During the program, through our interactions with family members and their children, 
and based on our prior interactions with young terrorist recruits, we were able to determine 
four main reasons for why the youth were struggling to break their ties with terrorist 
organizations and their recruiters. These are as follows: 
 
Established friendships: One of the reasons young people could not say no to their 
recruiters was the bonds and strong friendships they had already established with their 
recruiters. Many of the high school and university students indicated after our 
interventions that they knew what they were doing wrong, but they could not say no to 
their friends for fear of losing their friendship. In addition to engaging in one-to-one 
friendships, the recruiters introduced their new subjects to a larger network of close-
minded, in-group individuals who were already associated with the terrorist 
organization, so that the prospective recruits would also form bonds and establish 
friendships within the organization. At this stage, it became even more difficult for the 
young minds to cut their ties with the larger group they were involved with.  
 
Ideological factors and belief systems: The indoctrination process through 
ideological education carried out by terrorist organization members played a critical 
role in our program when we discovered the barriers against breaking one’s ties with a 
terrorist group. The prospective recruits in our program often thought that breaking 
their ties with an organization was a betrayal of the ideology and cause. If we could 
not intervene at an early of the recruitment process, or if the subjects had already 
radicalized themselves through other means, such as the internet and social media, 
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Psychological factors: After the family visits, as we started to spend time with some 
of the youth, we realized that several psychological factors were also barriers to 
cutting ties with an organization. The chief factor was the friendships and group bonds 
established through the recruiters. Many of the youngsters we interacted with 
indicated that they did not want to be alone. Their friends were their only outlet for fun 
outside of the home, and they often cited a lack of other means to have fun. They felt 
alone, even though the majority had several siblings close to their age.  
Another factor often brought up was the desire to avoid being stigmatized and labeled 
by the in-group or friend circles as “traitor,” “fearful” [“chicken” in the slang they 
were using], or “not man enough.” Another critical factor was “honor.” The group 
members who were trying to cut their ties at the beginning of the recruitment process 
felt that they would be seen as “disloyal” and “unworthy” in the eyes of their friends, 
which meant a lot in the patriarchal society in Sanliurfa.  
In addition, we found that some youth had mental problems and needed help. They 
were either not able to comprehend the situation they were being dragged into, or they 
simply did not care and wanted to go with the rhythm, regardless of the consequences. 
The last common psychological factor was rebellion against one’s family, especially 
against parents if they had had a conflict with their child in the past, or in some cases, 
if they had discovered their child’s interactions with a terrorist organization and tried 
to cut the ties by threatening them, which eventually backfired.   
 
Supposed prior offenses (non-violent and violent): Among the reasons the youth 
gave for fearing to cut their ties with the terrorist organization was that they believed 
they had already committed a crime, and they did not want to go to prison. Terrorist 
organizations basically embedded the idea that “you are either with us and free, or, if 
you break your ties, you will go to prison.” The supposed crimes often included being 
associated with a terrorist organization (the social group the recruit had joined), being 
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distributing brochures and pamphlets containing illegal material at their school or in 
their neighborhood. None of the youth reported an actual violent crime, and we, as the 
police, were not aware of any violent offense carried out by the subjects of the 
program.  
Summary of the Findings 
This program was unique to the Sanliurfa area, and the findings represent the profiles 
of families and their children there. There was no sampling of the participants, and everyone 
who was visited and responded to our surveys was included in the analysis. Among the 
significant and unique findings of this program are the following:  
 
The majority of our subjects lived in the suburbs. A total of 86% of the families who 
were visited lived in the suburbs of Sanliurfa. While those neighborhoods were not far 
away from the center of Sanliurfa, they consisted of underdeveloped sections of the 
city. 
 
The number of children in the families visited was significantly high. Half of the 
families had five to eight children, 75% had four or more, 18% had ten or more, and 
there were families with over twenty children, most of them living as a single 
household.  
 
Most of the fathers had low-skill jobs and worked extensive hours trying to support 
their families. Of the fathers, 33% were laborers, 16% were self-employed, 12% were 
deceased, and 9% were unemployed. 
 
The education levels of the fathers who responded to the survey were significantly 
low, both compared to Sanliurfa and to Turkey in general. Thirty-four percent of the 
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primary school graduates, and there were only four high school graduates and three 
college graduates.  
 
The mothers’ education levels were even lower; 68% were illiterate, and only 13% 
were primary school graduates; there were four mothers who had graduated from a 
high school and none with a college or university degree.  
 
Two-thirds of the families either did not have a stable income or had a very low 
income, even by Sanliurfa standards. Twenty-one percent of the families had no 
consistent work or made less than 500 TL per month; 46% had incomes between 500 
TL and 1,000 TL, which was not enough to support a small family. Nineteen percent 
of the families reported incomes between 1,000 TL and 2,000 TL, and 13% reported 
an income of 2,000 TL, which at the time was less than a new schoolteacher would 
make per month. 
 
The following were also observed: 
 
•  90% of the families and their close relatives had no one in the family working for the 
government; 
•  84% of the families welcomed the visiting teams openly and sincerely; only five 
families did not invite the team members into their houses and turned them 
away; 
•  82% of the families indicated that they were open to interactions with the police and 
had no negative biases against law enforcement; 18% of the families had initial 
doubts and suspicions; 
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• 86% of the families denied supporting any terrorist organizations; 10% openly 
indicated that they had sympathy towards a terrorist organization, and 3% stated 
that they were supporting the activities of a terrorist organization, at least by 
being present at their gatherings; 
•  88% of the families stated that they were not aware that their children were 
interacting with young members of a terrorist organization, with terrorist 
recruiters, or with a terrorist organization.   
 
At the end of the first year, the program had 86% success in cutting the ties of 
prospective terrorist recruits with friends affiliated with terrorist organizations, with terrorist 
recruiters, or with any terrorist entity. We expected that this percentage might drop slightly 
over time, due to factors such as the lack or discontinuation of parental supervision, departure 
from Sanliurfa for a college degree or work, or subjects’ being approached and persuaded by 
a terrorist organization again.  
Established friendships, ideological factors and belief systems, psychological factors, 
and supposed violent or non-violent prior offenses were among the chief reasons why the 
youth in Sanliurfa had difficulty breaking their ties with terrorist organizations. 
Common patterns were seen across the recruitment processes of different terrorist 
organizations. Although there were minor differences among the organizations and 
ideologies, most of the terrorist groups followed the pattern described in this study.  
The Sanliurfa program lasted for four years. Around 2,000 families were visited under 
this program between 2010 and 2014. This article includes an analysis of the dataset for the 
first year of operations. The subsequent phase of the program, which was extended to include 
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Discussion and Limitations 
 
Before we started the program, one of the issues we discussed considerably was whether we 
should include civilians—such as social workers, NGO representatives, and teachers—on our 
visiting teams, or whether we should work only with the civilians and not include any 
counterterrorism officers. In fact, we tested the idea by asking a few trusted NGO 
representatives to interact with a number of families, to see their reactions. A few problems 
arose with these civilian family visits. The first was that, regardless of whatever messages the 
civilian visitors or intervention teams communicated to the families, they were not able to 
persuade the families to cooperate. The families kept raising questions, including, “How can 
we trust you?” “What if counterterrorism officers come and arrest our son or daughter?” 
“What assurances can you give us?” After a few rounds of visits, we realized that it would be 
more productive if the visiting teams were plainclothes counterterrorism officers, who could 
assure the families that their children would not be arrested and that they would not be subject 
to any investigations if they cut their ties with terrorist organizations. In our case, in Sanliurfa, 
the families wanted to make sure that they were directly interacting with the authorities and 
wanted to have direct and open communication lines to the officers who could help them in 
the long run. 
We were aware that some of the families would hide their sympathy towards a terrorist 
ideology or their connections with a terrorist organization, given the fact that the visiting 
teams were counterterrorism officers. Moreover, we knew that many families, particularly at 
the beginning, would have biases against the police and the visiting teams. We understood 
that these factors would affect the reliability of our surveys, especially when we were trying 
to measure the families’ responses to our visits. However, all these issues were secondary 
concerns for us, as the objective of the program was not to carry out research, but rather to 
save the youth. Research and analysis focusing on the findings of the program were 
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We realized that the parents’ responses to some of the survey questions, such as when 
we asked if they had any connections with a terrorist organization or sympathy towards an 
ideology, might not be reliable and honest, as they knew they were dealing with the police, 
and obviously they would not have wanted to reveal their affiliations, if they had any. We 
were fine with that, and the team members tried to emphasize the non-investigative nature of 
the visits to overcome this problem. However, we knew some families would not be 
completely open, due to their fear of being investigated by the police or scrutinized by their 
terrorist associates.  
The visiting team’s interactions with the families were not audio-recorded. We did not 
want to cause concern for the families by recording the conversations, and we made it clear 
during our visits that there would be no recordings. All the narratives, team members’ 
observations, and parents’ responses were collected after the visits in written form. A team 
member took notes to protect the privacy of the family, and these were used later for the 
reports.  
Some families directly stated that they did not want their neighbors to be aware of the 
nature of the visits, that they were concerned that the appearance of the police at their homes 
would lead to their being stigmatized as criminals or terrorists, or simply that they wished to 
remain safe from the scrutiny of neighbors or tribe or family members. In sum, the visiting 
team members realized that some parents were not comfortable meeting with them in their 
homes. So, in some cases, the family visits could backfire, and the teams concluded it would 
be more productive to meet with these families at other locations, including police 
departments.   
The initial program findings were consistent with the first hypothesis. Eighty-four 
percent of the families welcomed the visiting teams openly and sincerely, and 82% indicated 
that they were open to interacting with the police and that they had no biases against law 
enforcement, which was a clear and strong indication of the families’ and parents’ willingness 
to work with the police to save their children. This assumption was also supported by the fact 
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findings and results of the program, we concluded that the majority of the families and parents 
did not want their children to become involved with terrorist organizations. 
The second hypothesis was also supported by the findings of the program. Eighty-
eight percent of the families stated that they were not aware that their children were 
interacting with a terrorist organization or with terrorist recruiters. This indicates a major 
problem that needs to be closely and carefully studied, as terrorist organizations often direct 
their new recruits or subjects to be vigilant and secretive about their connections and 
interactions.  
The findings of the program also supported the third hypothesis. Initially, during the 
first year, 86% of the prospective recruits cut their ties with friends who affiliated with 
terrorist organizations, terrorist recruiters, or other terrorist entities. We also understood that 
this was a long journey, and the initial disconnection from the terrorist circles might not 
inherently prevent terrorist recruitment in the long run. This was also acceptable to us, 
because we knew that if they had interacted with known terrorists, we would be aware of 
those interactions, which would prompt us to revisit families. However, due to the political 
turmoil in Turkey after the December 17, 2013, corruption operations against the family 
members and close circle of then-Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, the C/T police units all 
over Turkey were dismantled, new officers were assigned, and all prevention programs were 
halted. Therefore, we do not have any data to monitor the long-term success of the program.  
Finally, there is a need to state that the author was deeply involved in the Sanliurfa 
program as the creator and administer, and therefore, there are automatically issues of bias 
involved. This is why the goal of this article is not to “evaluate” the program but to present it 
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Final Remarks 
 
Terrorist organizations can stay alive only if they keep recruiting new members. Preventing 
terrorist recruitment may be one of the easiest, least lethal, and most humane counterterrorism 
tactics. Through this program, we were able to significantly reduce terrorist recruitment 
among the youth in Sanliurfa, including high school and university students, which resulted in 
a decrease in the number of terrorism-related incidents, including low-level attacks, such as 
arson and the throwing of Molotov cocktails, and other types of terrorist activities. While this 
program was carried out locally in Sanliurfa, it could easily be applied to reduce terrorist 
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